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UN Wars, US War Powers
John C. Yoo*
Pressure on traditional notions of US sovereignty are nowhere clearer than in the
area of national security. In a number of areas, such as arms control, the Clinton
administration has sought to achieve US foreign policy goals through multilateral
international institutions. Pursuing national security through international
organizations confers certain advantages for US policymakers, such as allowing the
United States to act under the aegis of multilateralism, which submerges the
prominence of US national interests and allows for the use of collective military
resources. Acting through such alliances, however, raises policy and constitutional
difficulties that pose problems for US notions of democratic accountability and the
separation of powers. This paper will address these issues by describing the impact of
multilateral interventions, such as those in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Haiti, upon the US
system of war powers.
In none of these cases did the Clinton administration receive congressional
authorization for the use of force abroad. While the administration has failed to issue
a defense of the legality of the Kosovo intervention, President Clinton has claimed
that he enjoys the constitutional authority under the commander-in-chief clause to
use force without congressional consent.2 Further, the President has justified these
military interventions more often on the need to uphold our obligations to the United
Nations ("UN") or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), than upon

Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). I am grateful to
Andrew Bacevich, Richard Perle, and Ruth Wedgwood for their comments on this paper. I also
thank John Bolton, Jack Goldsmith, and Jeremy Rabkin for inviting me to participate in the
conference held at the American Enterprise Institute.
1. For a ffller discussion of the constitutional issues, see John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the
Multilateral Future, 148 U Pa L Rev 1673 (2000); and John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old
Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 Const Commen 87
(1998). Many of the broader constitutional and policy issues are discussed in Jeremy Rabkin, Why
Sovereignty Matters (AEI Press 1998).
2. US Const Art I, § 2.
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congressional approval. While he has often signaled that he would welcome
congressional support, he also has made clear that he would implement his military
plans without it. President Clinton has refused to acknowledge that the War Powers
Resolution ("WPR") restricts his discretion. In fact, the Clinton administration's use
of the military in these long-term interventions has rendered the WPR a dead letter.
I.
In recent decades, no President has used force abroad as much as President
Clinton. In March 1999, President Clinton ordered 31,000 US servicemen and
women to engage in air operations against Serbia, the largest and most powerful
province of the former Yugoslavia, to prevent the "ethnic cleansing' of Albanians
living in Kosovo. As part of an operation sponsored by NATO, 7,000 US ground
troops then entered Kosovo on June 10, 1999, after NATO bombing had forced
Serbia to withdraw its forces. It is unclear when they wil be withdrawn, as NATO's
goals include not just ending war but building a new nation in Kosovo. President
Clinton never received congressional authorization for the use of force in Kosovo or
Serbia, nor did Congress declare war. US troops engaged in hostilities well past the
sixty-day time limit imposed by the WPR.
US intervention was triggered by events in the spring of 1999., In early March,
Serbian military forces began a broad offensive aimed at driving the Albanian
population out of the province. On March 23, after the Clinton administration's
efforts at negotiation had failed, the Senate passed a concurrent resolution authorizing
the President to "conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation
with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)" 4 On March 24, US warplanes, in conjunction with other NATO
forces, began attacking Serbian forces in Kosovo.
In a nationally televised address, President Clinton argued that air strikes were
necessary to protect innocent Albanians, to prevent the conflict from spreading to the
rest of Europe, and to act with our European allies in maintaining peace.' President
Clinton declared that the military's mission would be "to demonstrate NATO's
seriousness of purpose," to "deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians
in Kosovo," and "to seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the
people of Kosovo."6 When air strikes did not convince Serbia to withdraw its forces,
NATO air and missile operations expanded beyond Serbian military units in Kosovo

3. These facts are taken from Campbell v Clinton, 52 F Supp 2d 34, 39 (D DC 1999).
4.

S Cong Res 21,106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 23,1999).

5. Address to the Nation on Air Strikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 516 (Mar 24, 1999).
6. Id.
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to military, strategic, and civilian targets within Serbia itself, such as air defense,
electrical, communications, and government facilities.
Hewing to the pattern set during previous administrations, presidential initiative
in war-making produced congressional financial support but nothing more. On the
same day that air strikes began, the House of Representatives passed a resolution by a
424 to 1 vote that declared its support for US troops, but refused to authorize the use
of force. 7 On March 26, President Clinton sent a message to Congress claiming that
the Milosevic regime had violated the UN Charter, UN Security Council resolutions,
and NATO resolutions, and justifying his unilateral decision to use force on his
"constitutional authority to conduct US foreign relations and as Commander-inChief and Chief Executive." On April 28, the House of Representatives first rejected,
by a vote of 427 to 2, a proposal to declare war upon Yugoslavia.8 It then rejected, by a
tie 213 to 213 vote, a Senate resolution authorizing the use of force 9 By 290 to 139,
the House also defeated a concurrent resolution that would have required the
President to remove all US troops from Yugoslavia operations. It then passed a bill
that barred the use of any fimds for the deployment of US forces in Yugoslavia
without specific congressional authorization," which the Senate refused to enact. On
May 20, Congress doubled the Administration's request for emergency funding for
Yugoslavia war operations, to the tune of $11.8 billion, but without authorizing the
12
war.
The conclusion of the Kosovo conflict highlighted the WPR's impotence in
constraining presidential decision-making. Bombing attacks against Serbian targets
both in Kosovo and in Serbia proper did not end until June 10, 1999, seventy-nine
days after the war first began and nineteen days after the Resolutions sixty-day clock
had ended. 3 As part of the peace terms accepted by Serbia, NATO sent 50,000
troops, 7,000 of them American, into Kosovo to maintain peace and security during
the transition to Kosovar self-government.' 4 Although an American, General Wesley

7. H Res 130, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 24,1999) in 145 Cong Rec 47, H1660-69. After recognizing

that President Clinton had sent US armed forces to operate against Serbia, the resolution merely
declared that "the House of Representatives supports the members of the United States Armed
Forces who are engaged in military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
recognizes their professionalism, dedication, patriotism, and courage."
8. HRJ Res 44,106th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 28,1999) in 145 Cong Rec 59, H2427-41.
9. HR Con Res 21,106th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 28, 1999) in 145 Cong Rec 59, H2441-52.
lo. HR Con Res 82,106th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 28, 1999) in 145 Cong Rec 59, H2376-2400.
11. HR 1569,106th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 28,1999) in 145 Cong Rec 59, H 2400-14.
12. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub L No 106-31, 113 Star 57 (1999), codified at 7
USC § 1427(a).
13. Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo, 35 Weekly Comp Pres
Doc 1074 (June 10, 1999).
14. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting the Deployment of United States Military Personnel as
Part of the Kosovo International Security Force, 35 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1107 (June 12,1999).
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Clark, directed the bombing campaign, US troops in the peacekeeping force served
under both US and non-US NATO command under the ultimate authority of a
British general' 5 Congress never authorized the use of US troops, which will have
been deployed to the region for more than a year by the summer of 2000. Congress,
however, agreed to provide supplementing appropriations for a long-term military
presence in Kosovo. In other words, Congress could have stopped the war, if it had
the political will to do so, merely by refusing to appropriate the funds to keep the
military operations going.
As they consistently have throughout the postwar period, the federal ,courts
refused to adjudicate the constitutionality of the President's unilateral use of force or
his violation of the WPR's terms. During the Kosovo bombing campaign, twentyseven House members sued President Clinton on the ground that he had usurped
Congress's power to declare war and infringed the WPR by conducting air strikes
without congressional authorization. 16 Dismissing the action, the District Court for
the District of Columbia found that the legislators did not have Article III standing to
challenge the President's action because Congress, as a whole, had not acted to
terminate the intervention. 7 Campbell v Clinton followed in the wake of earlier
decisions of the DC District Court, including two opinions rendered during the
Persian Gulf War that had found similar challenges nonjusticiable. 8 On appeal, Judge
Silberman wrote for a unanimous panel of the DC Circuit that the congressional
plaintiffs in Campbell lacked standing. Judge Silberman also wrote separately to make
dear his conclusion that inter-branch struggles over war powers present nonjusticiable
political questions. Judicial reluctance to enter the fray is consistent with historical
practice, as the Supreme Court has never agreed to reach the merits of any challenge
to presidential war-making authority abroad. 9
Kosovo represents the culmination of several trends in the US use of force over
the last eight years. In 1994, pursuant to UN mandate, President Clinton planned a
military intervention in Haiti, despite a unanimous Senate resolution declaring that
he had no authorization to do so. Stating that he had sufficient independent
constitutional authority, Clinton sent 20,000 US troops to supervise Haiti's transition

15.
16.
17.
AS.

19.

Id.
Campbell, 52 F Supp 2d at 39.
Id at 43.
See, for example, Dellums v Bush, 752 F Supp 1141 (D DC 1990) (challenge by Congressmen to
deployment in Persian Gulf War held to be unripe); Ange v Bush, 752 F Supp 509 (D DC 1990)
(challenge by National Guard sergeant to orders deploying him to Persian Gulf held to be a
nonjusticiable political question).
Of course, the Court has addressed the question of how far the commander-in-chief power extends
domestically. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952). Youngstown, however, did
not review President Truman's authority to initiate and wage the Korean War without formal
congressional authorization.
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to a democratic government in violent conditions. Five years later, those troops are
only now finishing the wind-down of their deployment.2 In 1993, the administration
began its long involvement in the Balkans by sending US warplanes to enforce a no-fly
zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. That same year, the President dispatched US troops
to Macedonia as part of a UN peacekeeping operation. In February 1994, sixty US
warplanes conducted air strikes against Serbian targets to end the conflict in Bosnia,
again pursuant to UN authorization. In December 1995, President Clinton ordered
the deployment of 20,000 US troops to Bosnia to implement a peace agreement; at
least 6,000 US servicemen and women remain there today.2 In addition to the
Balkans, President Clinton has engaged in several limited uses of force: against Iraq
(twice) and against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan, mostly through the
use of air strikes by warplanes and cruise missiles. In all of these crises, the
administration acted without statutory authorization, sometimes in the face of House
or Senate resolutions opposing the intervention and instead claimed support from the
UN or NATO. Troops have participated in several of these operations well beyond
the time limits demanded by the WPR with little congressional sanction or efforts at
enforcement.
The recent past suggests that the modern practice of war-making has freed itself
from the partisanship that afflicted earlier struggles over foreign policy. Before the
Clinton administration, war power disputes invariably assumed party lines, with
Republicans defending executive power and Democrats asserting that all hostilities
required legislative authorization. Republicans controlled the Executive branch for all
but four of the twenty-four years between the presidencies of Nixon and Clinton,
while Democrats controlled the House for that entire period. After President
Clinton's electoral victories in 1992 and 1996, however, Democrats in Congress have
lost their fire on the war powers issue-it is astonishing how Democratic
Congressmen who vociferously attacked aid to El Salvador or escorting oil tankers in
the Persian Gulf or the Grenada, Panama, and Persian Gulf Wars have been so
obviously inconsistent under the Clinton administration-while other Democrats in
the Executive branch defend presidential war powers with all of the fervor of their
Republican predecessors.' The only governmental critics of the modern system of war
powers are Republican congressmen who began service only after the 1994 elections
and thus are not bound by earlier statements on war powers under Republican
presidents. Practice under the Clinton administration seems to have established, for
the first time since Vietnam, true bipartisan precedents in both Congress and the

20.

Steven L. Myers, Full-Time US Force in Haiti to Leave an Unstable Nation, NY Times Al (Aug 26,
1999).

21.

Id.

22.

See, for example, Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War PresidentialPower and the Use of Military Force,
50 U Miami L Rev 107, 109-10 (1995).
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Presidency in favor of a. flexible system of war powers characterized by executive
initiative and legislative funding approval.
II.
Kosovo may represent a theoretical shift, one that the Clinton administration has
accelerated if not started, in the US way of war. During the Reagan and Bush
administrations, the United States often intervened unilaterally, quickly, and in
pursuit of purely US interests. Invasions in Grenada and Panama, for example,
occurred without any significant multilateral participation, were executed within the
sixty-day WPR period, and did not receive Security Council approval. Although the
Persian Gulf War was conducted pursuant to Security Council resolution, the
operation was still predominantly American in force structure, military organization,
and political leadership. Throughout these interventions, the United States used
force to defend its security interests: maintaining its hegemony in certain regions of
the world, containing the influence of its Cold War adversary, and retaliating against
attacks on itself and its allies.
Intervention during the Clinton years has been anything but unilateral, swift, and
purely in the national self-interest. In Bosnia and Kosovo, US forces participate as
part of an international military structure, sometimes under foreign command.
Operations are no longer short. Deployments in Haiti and Bosnia have continued for
years, rather than weeks. US troops may well be stationed in Kosovo even longer.
Lengths of deployments have increased as the goals of the deployments have become
more diffuse. Earlier interventions usually sought a decisive victory over the military
forces of another nation or the replacement of an unfriendly regime. Under the
Clinton administration, however, civilian leaders have employed military force for
more delicate objectives, such as rebuilding nations, enforcing international peace, or
maintaining the status quo. In Kosovo and Somalia, US objectives even included
preventing human rights abuses or humanitarian crises that occurred wholly within
the sovereign territory of another nation. These goals fall well short of the military
and political victories sought by earlier administrations.
To be sure, the record of postwar interventions provides other examples of US
military participation in international organizations. Both the Korean War and the
Persian Gulf War were authorized by the UN Security Council. Because of the
strategic imperatives involved, however, it seems safe to conclude that UN approval
may have been necessary for purposes of international opinion, but that Security
Council refusal to authorize the use of force would not have prevented the United
States from intervening. The Clinton administration has given this record a new and
potentially significant twist. Under Clinton, the approval of the UN or other
international organizations has become the foundation upon which justifications for
intervention are built. In sending troops to Haiti and Bosnia, for example, President
Clinton expressly relied upon the need to carry out UN Security Council resolutions
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as support rather than domestic legal mandates. Although he could not rely upon the
Security Council for approval of the Kosovo bombings, President Clinton still
justified the intervention by appealing to our NATO obligations.! As he declared
when announcing the bombing campaign, "America has a responsibility to stand with
our allies when they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom, and

stability in Europe." 4 One has the impression that without UN or NATO approval,
the United States was unlikely to have intervened in any of these cases.
It seems that the recent rise in cooperation with international organizations is not
just for the sake of "window dressing." In many other areas, such as the environment,
crime, and arms control, problems that were once viewed as wholly within the powers
of individual nations to address have become international in scope. Developing
solutions to these problems may require multilateral structures to be fully
comprehensive and effective. Correspondingly, policy initiatives have created new
forms of international cooperation that include multiple parties, create independent
international organizations, and pierce the veil of the nation-state and seek to regulate
individual private conduct. Globalization and its attendant effects, however, place new
stresses on our domestic constitutional and political system. Novel forms of
international cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to
international organizations that lack American openness and accountability.
Collective action may require the United States to vest legal authority in institutions
and individuals that are free from the legal and political controls that apply to US
officers and institutions. Multilateral action may alter domestic decision-making
processes on foreign policy, due to the need to comply with international obligations.
Changes in domestic political and constitutional structures may be necessary to
achieve the full benefit of multilateralism.
Events in Kosovo serve as a prime example of the sharpening tension between
international cooperation and the domestic legal system. Kosovo presented problems
of regional and even international significance. Historically, the Balkans have been a
tinderbox for broader European wars. Restoring international peace and stability in
the wake of these wars has required the United States to expend lives and resources.
US and European policymakers feared that conduct that would once have been
considered domestic only in nature now threatened to cause wider disruptions to
European security. For example, Serbia's course of repression produced a stream of
refugees that might have destabilized neighboring countries, and ultimately our
European allies. Widespread human rights violations not only offended European and
international norms, but might have even provoked intervention by regional powers,
raising the possibility of conflict between greater powers and even NATO allies.
23. Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), 35 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 516 (Mar 24, 1999).
24 . Id.
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Responses to this transnational problem required a multilateral solution. No
individual European nation had the military or political wherewithal to end Serbian
aggression. It was equally unlikely that the United States would unilaterally intervene
so far from home in a nation with close cultural and historical ties to its former Cold
War enemy, where its direct national interests were hard to define. Operating
through the multilateral structure of NATO allowed member nations to gather their
collective resources to address the common security risk posed by"events in Kosovo.
Multilateralism allowed the NATO nations, particularly the United States, to
submerge the identification of any single nation's interest as dominant. in the
operation. NATO presented a less threatening front to nations such as Russia that
sympathized with Serbia and might have feared an intervention so close to its own
borders. NATO allies could share the risks and burdens of difficult tasks such as
nation-building, a job which no single nation may have the determination and
resources to handle. Kosovo signaled the transformation of NATO from a defensive
alliance, whose primary goals were to contain Soviet expansionism and to promote
European reconstruction, to a multilateral organization that now engages in pro-active
operations to preempt threats to regional security.
III.
Notwithstanding these benefits, international cooperation raises difficult policy
and legal problems. Kosovo in particular raises three issues worth discussion. First,
does US participation in multilateral war-making without congressional consent
violate the Constitution's allocation of war powers? Here, I also will ask whether UN
or NATO wars alter the systems of government accountability that we have
developed in the war-making area. Second, how closely can the United States
continue to integrate its military into the armed forces of an international
organization? Here, I will discuss whether the President can and should place US
military units under the command of foreign officers. Third, how do treaty
obligations and international law norms affect the war calculus under constitutional
law and domestic policy? Here, I will ask whether the President's need to uphold
treaty obligations gives him any greater constitutional or political authority vis-a'-vis
Congress, and whether the United States need adhere to international norms in
implementing its foreign policy goals, as a constitutional or policy matter.
A. War Powers. International law scholars generally agree that unilateral
presidential war-making without congressional authorization violates the
Constitution. Prominent academics such as Louis Fisher, John Hart Ely, Michael
Glennon, Louis Henkin, and Harold Koh have argued that the three branches of
government have failed in their constitutional obligations by allowing the pattern and
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practice of the recent past to continue.2 As they conceive it, the Constitution bars the
President from initiating offensive wars (but not defensive ones) unless Congress
affirmatively authorizes the use of force. Further, federal courts have the duty to
enforce this shared allocation of the war power. These scholars rest their arguments
almost wholly on two interrelated claims. First, the text of the Declare War Clause
vests Congress with the authority to decide on the initiation of all forms of military
hostilities. Second, pro-Congress scholars assert, the Framers intended to transfer this
power from the Executive to the Legislature because they believed that a multimember legislature would be less prone to excessive war-making than a single
executive.
These scholars leave little room for doubt in their conclusions. As Professor Ely
declares, "there is a clarity of the Constitution on this question." While he admits
"the 'original understanding' of the document's Framers and ratiflers can be obscure to
the point of inscrutability," he abruptly declares that "in this case, . .. it isnt.
Professor Koh maintains that "the Constitution did not permit the President to order
US armed forces to make war without meaningfully consulting with Congress and
receiving its affirmative authorization." They support the V-PR's limitations on the
President's ability to use force for longer than sixty-days; if the WPR has any faults, in
the eyes of these professors, it is that it is not tougher on the President.
Under this unbending approach, Kosovo clearly failed constitutional standards.
President Clinton committed 31,000 troops to an air war that lasted seventy-nine
days, well in excess of the limitations of the War Powers Resolution. He then sent
7,000 more troops for a long-lasting ground deployment in Kosovo itself. Congress
never declared war, nor did it issue any kind of statutory authorization. Although
Congress provided funding for the war and expressed its support for the troops, critics
of presidential war-making authority have never accepted such actions as sufficient
legislative authorization. Surprisingly, however, legal academics fell silent during the
Kosovo intervention. As far as I can tell, no leading scholar raised questions during
the Kosovo war about its constitutionality. This absence of criticism is puzzling and
even embarrassingly inconsistent. If we apply the consensus view on war powers that
prevails in the academy, Kosovo was an unconstitutional war.

25.

See, for example, Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 SIU L J 931,

967-80 (1999); John H. Ely, War and Responsibility 47-67 (Princeton 1993); Michael J. Glennon,
Constitutional Democracy 35-79 (Princeton 1990); Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy and
Foreign Affairs 17-43 (Columbia 1990); Harold H. Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing
PowerAfter the Iran-ContraAffair 117-49 (Yale 1990).
26. Ely, War and Responsibility at 5 (cited in note 25).
27. Idat 3.
28. Harold H. Koh, Presidential War and Congressional Consent- The Law Professors' Memorandum in
Dellums v. Bush, 27 StanJ Intl L 247, 249 (1991); see also Koh, NationalSecurity Constitutionat 47-67,
76-77 (cited in note 25).
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If,however, we adopt a more pro-Executive approach, such as the one promoted
by scholars such as Robert Bork,' Henry Monaghan, 30 Eugene Rostow,3 ' Phillip
Bobbitt 2 Robert Turner 3 and myself, then Kosovo clearly fell within constitutional
standards. These scholars generally agree that the President has the authority to use
force unilaterally under the commander-in-chief or executive power clauses. They
believe that the declare war clause provides Congress with the more limited power to
define the nation's status under international law, and that Congress's checking power
over executive war-making flows more naturally from the power of the purse. Rather
than interpret the Constitution as imposing a fixed system on war-making, these
scholars conclude that the Constitution has sufficient flexibility to allow the President
to use national military power to shape international events. I have further argued that
the evidence from the original understanding-the fact that Great Britain declared
war only once in the many wars it fought in the pre-ratification period, that the
Constitution represented an effort to expand executive powers, that the Federalists
argued that Congress would use its funding powers to check executive military
adventurism-buttresses this reading of the text.
Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect Congress to use its appropriations powers to
cut off troops in the field. We should not mistake a failure of political will, however,
for a violation of the Constitution. Congress undoubtedly possessed the power to end
the Kosovo war-it simply chose not to use it. Affirmatively providing funding for a
war, or at the very least, refusing to cut off previous appropriations, represents a
political determination by Congress that it will allow the President to receive the
credit for success or the blame for failure. If it chose to, Congress could use its
constitutional powers over appropriations and the legal aspects of hostilities to
leverage a greater political role for itself, just as it has in many domestic areas of
regulation. Not wanting to appear to have failed to support the troops is a decision of
political, not constitutional significance. Recent wars show only that Congress has
refused to exercise the ample powers at its disposal and not that there has been an
alarming breakdown in the constitutional structure.
29.

30.

31.
32.

33.
34.

35.

Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 Wash U L Q 693, 695-701
(1990).
Henry P. Monaghan, PresidentialWar Making, 50 BU L Rev 19 (1970).
Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 Tex L Rev 833 (1972).
Philip Bobbitr, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: ConstitutionalLessons of
Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 Mich L Rev 1364 (1994).
Robert F. Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law in US Foreign Policy
(Brasse},s 1991).
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understandingof War Powers, 84
Cal L Rev 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, Clio at War The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U
Colo L Rev 1169 (1999); Yoo, 148 U Pa L Rev 1673 (cited in note 1).
Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 242-49 (cited in note 34).
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Constitutional law only answers the threshold questions about US cooperation
in multilateral organizations. My reading of the Constitution's allocation of war
powers indicates that the President has the freedom to use the US military to
participate in collective security actions because he already has the unilateral authority
to use force abroad without congressional authorization. That conclusion does not
address the more difficult question whether coalition warfare makes for good US
national security policy. Using international organizations to achieve security ends
might amount to war-making by committee. As apparently happened in Kosovo,
NATO's unanimous consent requirement essentially allowed those member nations
most reluctant to use force to dictate the alliance's rules of engagement. Differing goals
among the NATO nations may lead to a diffusion of war aims, as some nations may
have wanted merely to convince Serbia to return to negotiations while other countries
may have wanted to drive Serbia out of Kosovo. Confusion or disagreement over war
aims may lead to ineffective strategic or tactical choices, or to an imbalance between
military means and political ends. This effect may only be compounded when one of
the aims of an intervention is to prove the political unity of the alliance itself. Political
leaders may prove even less willing to undertake necessary military measures if those
actions cause dissension with an alliance that is concerned about the appearance of
solidarity.
Furthermore, a multilateral organization itself might have interests, or at least
decision-making values, that differ from those of its members. For example, officers of
international organizations might be more likely to respect international law, which
gives such organizations their legal status and powers, than US military and political
leaders, who might be willing to tolerate violations of international law in the course
of achieving national security goals. International organizations such as NATO also
might seek new missions that sustain or expand their power and existence; we
certainly know this has been the case with domestic administrative agencies. It may be
no mistake that Kosovo resulted in the transformation of NATO from a purely
defensive alliance against a disappearing foe into a regional security arrangement that
now acts out-of-area. A growing divergence between the goals, not just of other
NATO or UN members and those of the United States but between those of the
international organizations and of the United States, should give even more pause to
US policymakers who see multilateral cooperation as the future of war.
B. Foreign Command. Similar issues arise with the manner in which US forces
cooperate with international organizations. During Kosovo, for example, overall
command remained with General Clark who served both as NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander Europe and as commander-in-chief of the US European Command.
Clark's dual roles meant that strategic command of US forces rested in the hands of a
US general. US troops, however, could serve under Clark's non-American theater
commanders, such as British General Michael Jackson, who commanded the 16,000
NATO troops stationed in Macedonia during the air war and then led the NATO
ground forces that have occupied Kosovo. In other deployments ordered by President
Fall2000
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Clinton, such as those in Somalia and Bosnia, US forces attacked military targets at
the instruction of non-US commanders acting under the authority either of NATO
or the UN. 6
It appears that President Clinton's willingness to send US troops into combat
under non-US officers is unprecedented. American experience in modern alliance
warfare suggests that while the political branches have allowed the transfer only of
certain levels of command to non-US officers, they have reserved most forms of
command-especially at the tactical level-solely for US military officers. Only US
officers have exercised the authority to both coerce and discipline US units and
troops.7 Postwar conflicts do not appear to have changed this practice. Although the
UN Charter calls for the creation of a UN military force composed of national units
placed at the Security Council's policy, strategic, and operational command," the ideal
of an international military force died with the advent of the Cold War. In the two
large-scale military conflicts sanctioned by the UN, the Korean War and the Persian
Gulf War, US generals exercised strategic command over the allied military, while US
officers maintained operational and tactical command over US troops. As purely US
interventions, the use of force in places such as Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama did
not raise questions of multilateral command.
Interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, and now Kosovo have departed from this
practice. Responding to congressional efforts to stop this new policy,39 the Clinton
administration has claimed a broad constitutional power in the President to delegate
military command authority to any person.4" According to the administration, the
President's Commander-in-Chief power allows him to select whomever he believes
necessary for military success. Because "UN peacekeeping missions involve
multilateral arrangements that require delicate and complex accommodations of a
variety of interests and concerns, including those of the nations that provide troops or
resources," the administration argues, a mission's success may depend on the
36. David Kaye, Are There Limits to American Military Alliance?: PresidentialPower to Place American Troops
Under Non-American Commanders,5 Transnad L & Contemp Probs 339,438-43 (1995).
37. Id at 428; see also Richard M. Leighton, Allied Unity of Command in the Second World War: A Study in
Regional Military Organization,67 Pol Sci Q399, 402,425 (1952).
38.
39.

UN Charter Art 43(1) (1945).
Congress considered legislation in 1996 to prohibit the expenditure of any funds for US armed
forces that served under UN operational and tactical command. Section 3 of HR 3308, 104th Cong,
2d Sess (Apr 4, 1996), required that "fuinds appropriated or otherwise made available for the
Department of Defense may not be obligated or extended for activities of any element of the armed
forces that after the date of enactment of this section is placed under United Nations operational or
tactical controL" The bill defined UN command as command by an official acting on behalf of the
UN in a peacekeeping or similar operation, where the senior military commander of the force is not
an active duty US military officer.

40. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical Control, Memorandum
for Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal Advisor to the National Security
Council, May 8,1996, <hrtp://www.usdoj.gov/olc/hr3308.wpd> (visited Sep 16,2000).
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commander's nationality or on the "degree to which the operation is perceived as a
UN activity" and not that solely of the United States."
This practice has both constitutional and policy problems. First, the
administration's legal justification for its recent multilateral command policy fails to
account for the Constitution's limitation on the delegation of federal power outside of
the national government. 42 While the Supreme Court has recognized that the
Constitution allows Congress to transfer its lawmaking power to the Executive
branch, and while the President has broad discretion to delegate authority to his
subordinates within the Executive branch, the Constitution nowhere permits the
President, the treaty makers, or Congress to delegate federal power completely outside
of the national government. In fact, placing US troops under foreign command runs
counter to recent Supreme Court cases, which have held that the Constitution
requires that only officers of the United States exercise substantial federal authority.43
This law of conservation of federal power prevents the national government, as a
whole, from concealing or confusing the lines of governmental authority and
responsibility. When only US officers exercise federal power under federal law, the
people may hold the actions of the government accountable. International or foreign
officials, however, have no obligation to pursue US policy-they do not take an oath
to uphold the Constitution, nor can any US official hold them responsible for their
deeds. Allowing the transfer of command authority to non-US officers threatens the
basic principle of government accountability.
Transfer of command authority to foreign commanders also has the effect of
cutting Congress and the public out of the policy debate over the use of force.
Although, as a formal matter, the President has plenary control over the military as
Commander-in-Chief, Congress has other informal methods for overseeing and
regulating the armed forces. It not only maintains lines of communication to officers
in the services, but it can employ oversight hearings and make use of the press to
gather information and influence national security policy. If the President, however,
delegates command authority over US troops entirely outside of the federal
government, neither Congress nor the public can determine whether foreign or
international commanders are exercising their authority according to US standards,
nor can Congress or the public enforce their policy wishes through the usual legal or
political methods open when power is delegated within the Executive branch. If
Congress or the people disagree with military policy or disapprove of the execution of
a military operation, they have no political avenue to oversee the officers who are in
command. They cannot demand that the President remove an officer for
incompetence, failure to obey orders, or disagreement over policy.
Id (emphasis omitted).
Consider Yoo, 15 Const Commen 87 (cited in note 1).
43. See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976).
41.

42.
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Second, the lack of formal authority over foreign commanders may increase the
possibility that the pursuit of US national interests will take a back seat to coalition
goals. Any exercise of federal authority by an individual who is not a member of the
Executive branch and thus not removable by the President prevents the President
from fully controlling the implementation of national policy.' Once the President
delegates authority to a foreign commander, he cannot issue orders to that
commander, backed up by the threat of removal and discipline, as he could to an US
officer, even though that foreign official may issue directives to subordinate US
soldiers. Although they may hold the power of life and death over US soldiers, foreign
commanders may hold very different allegiances and interests from those of US
officers. Foreign commanders, for example, may have very different attitudes toward
tactical strategies, acceptable casualty rates, and the amount of violence to inflict when
using force. In fact, as the Clinton administration has noted, the independence of such
foreign commanders from US control is one of the raisons d'etre for international
enforcement actions. One of the very purposes of multilateralism is to create the
impression that a military operation represents the policy of a neutral international
organization, rather than that of the worlds remaining superpower. It seems,
however, that indulging the appearance of multilateralism makes it almost inevitable
that foreign commanders will pursue goals that deviate from pure US interests.
C. International Law and Domestic Politics. Kosovo raises issues of constitutional
dimension concerning the relationship between international organizations and law
on the one hand, and US domestic law and institutions on the other. Many
international law and politics scholars have argued that fulfilling our treaty obligations
could provide the President with the constitutional authority to use force without
further congressional authorization. 4" Such claims raise two significant questions:
whether Congress is obliged to support presidential war-making when treaty
obligations are at stake, and whether the President can take the United States into
war in violation of international law. Practice during the Kosovo war indicates,
contrary to the claims of many international law scholars, that the President gains
little additional constitutional authority when acting pursuant to treaty, and that he
remains free to violate international law in the national interest.
The presence of a treaty obligation does not enhance the President's war powers,
because, as I have argued earlier, he already enjoys unilateral authority to use force
abroad. This provides no comfort, however, to those who believe that Congress must
See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale
LJ 541,593-99 (1994).
45. See, for example, Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign
Relations Law, UN Police Action in Lieu of War 'The Old Order Cbangetb," 85 Am J Intl L 63 (1991).
For a trenchant criticism of Franck and Patel, see Michael J Glennon and Allison R Hayward,
Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the Commander in Cbief Power Be Delegated to the United
Nations?, 82 Geo LJ 1573 (1994).
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authorize all military hostilities. These scholars attempt to escape this problem by
arguing that a treaty obligation can require Congress to support presidential warmaking. According to some, a President armed with a Security Council Resolution
could claim that Congress had the constitutional responsibility to find any use of
force authorized by the UN or NATO.4 If treaties are laws of the land, these scholars
argue, Congress has a constitutional duty to fulfill their terms even if it disagrees with
executive foreign policy or the objectives behind the treaty.
I believe that this approach-essentially the theory underpinning the doctrine of
self-executing treaties-upsets the constitutional balance between the treaty and the
legislative powers.47 The original understanding indicates that the Framers understood
the legislative power to serve as a crucial check upon the Executive's control over
foreign affairs generally, and the treaty power specificaly. While the Executive would
enjoy the freedom to manage international relations, the legislative power-with its
monopoly over the regulation of domestic affairs-would provide a crucial
constitutional and political check on executive power and policies.49 In light of this
understanding, Congress remains free to exercise its constitutional authorities as it
sees fit, regardless of the President's claims that he is upholding treaty obligations.
Even if the UN or NATO directed its member nations to intervene militarily, and
even if these directives were considered valid treaty obligations, Congress has the
constitutional discretion to prevent the Executive from fulfilling those duties.
While refusing to fund actions necessary to fulfill our treaty obligations might
violate international law, it does not violate the Constitution. By invoking our
obligations under NATO, therefore, the President may have provided a political
justification for the Kosovo war, but not one that could have constitutionally
compelled congressional support. Whether Congress ought to have supported the
Kosovo war for policy reasons is a different and more difficult question. On the one
hand, it did appear that the credibility and unity of the alliance was at stake-if
NATO had failed, fissures in the alliance and its failure of will would have been put
on display. On the other hand, NATO's leaders themselves risked what fifty years of
steady US leadership and North Atlantic cooperation had built. The alliance's
political leadership chose to risk the alliance's unity for a conflict within the sphere of
influence of its former Cold War adversary, on terrain that historically has frustrated
numerous invaders and over issues that are the subject of centuries-old ethnic and
religious hatreds. Because of America's political and military leadership in NATO, no
46. See, for example, Louis Henlin, ForeignAffairs and the US Constitution 250 (Clarendon 2d ed 1996).
47. For a more detailed explanation, see generally John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties,
Non.Self.Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum L Rev 1955 (1999); and John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking- A Textual and StructuralDefense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum L Rev
2218 (1999).
48. Yoo, 99 Colum L Rev at 2221-33 (cited in note 47).
49. Id.
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alliance decision could be imposed on the United States without the President's
consent. But that does not answer the question whether Congress ought to have
supported the President's decision, especially as US security interests became
submerged into broader alliance goals.
US intervention raises a second, related question: whether the President has a
constitutional duty to obey international law. It seems difficult to dispute that
President Clinton violated international law-without domestic objection-by
attacking a sovereign nation without Security Council approval. Under the UN
Charter, a nation may not use force against another member state unless either it is
acting in its self-defense or the action has received the authorization of the UN
Security Council." Unless one can make out the difficult claim that Serbian activities
rose to the level of genocide and hence a crime against humanity that any nation has
the right to stop, it initially seems that the tragedies in Kosovo represented internal
Yugoslavian matters; the Charter forbids the resolution by force of these domestic
matters. While one can make (and I might subscribe to) the argument that
international law must recognize that a nation may use force to defend its vital
national interests even if a cross-border invasion has not occurred, the UN Charter
and most international legal scholars exclude this possibility. As Professor Henkin has
argued. "By adhering to the Charter, the United States has given up the right to go to
war at will."5
Under this approach, the Clinton administration's military attack upon Serbia
violated international law. According to the views of many international lawyers, this
should have made Kosovo presumptively unconstitutional. For example, many leading
commentators argue that the President has a constitutional duty to enforce customary
international law. While some admit that certain forms of constitutional or statutory
authority might allow the President to violate international law, 3 others go farther in

50.

si.
52.

53.

UN Charter, Arts 2(4), 39,42,51 (cited in note 38).
Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 250 (cited in note 46).
The reasoning proceeds like this: International law-either through treaty or as federal common
law-is part of the "Laws of the Land" under Article VI's Supremacy Clause. Article II's
requirement that the President enforce the laws, according to these scholars, means that the
President must obey international law. A President may not violate international law, just as he
cannot violate a statute, unless he believes it to be unconstitutional. As Professor Henkin has
written: 'There can be little doubt that the President has the duty, as well as the authority, to take

care that international law, as part of the law of the United States, is faithfully executed." See Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich L Rev 1555, 1567 (1984); see also
Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 Am J Ind L 930, 936 (1986); Michael J
Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary InternationalLaw by the Cbief Executive
Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw U L Rev 321 (1985); Jules Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts
Between ForeignPolicy and InternationalLaw, 71 Va L Rev 1071 (1985).
See, for example, Glennon, 80 Nw U L Rev at 325 (cited in note 52) (arguing that only when
President acts pursuant to statutory authorization may he violate international law); and Henkin, 80
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claiming that the President cannot violate certain forms of international law regardless
of his domestic authority. Although the inclusion of customary international law as
federal common law is open to potentially crippling doubts,"5 such arguments might
be on firmer ground when it comes to treaties, which are explicitly mentioned in the
Supremacy Clause. 56 If foreign relations law scholars were correct about the binding
nature of even customary international law on the Executive branch, then certainly
courts could enjoin the President from violating a more concrete form of international
law-namely the UN Charter-that had been adopted through the treaty process.
Despite these arguments, Kosovo demonstrates that international law imposed
little restraint upon presidential action and that federal courts were not about to
enforce treaty obligations so as to restrict the commander-in-chief power.57 What was
striking in the US public debate over Kosovo was the almost complete absence of any
arguments, especially from international law scholars, that the war's apparent violation
of international law should pose any domestic legal difficulties for President Clinton.
Kosovo demonstrates why these theories about the domestic effects of international
law are flawed. The constitutional text nowhere brackets presidential or federal power
within the confines of international law. When the Supremacy Clause discusses the
sources of federal law, it only enumerates the Constitution, "the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof," and treaties, not international law.
If the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause does not render treaties
automatically self-executing in federal court-not to mention self-executing against
the Executive branch-then certainly non-treaty international law cannot bind the
President as a constitutional matter.
Putting aside whether the Constitution requires the President to enforce
international law, it is not clear that obeying international law is always in the best
interests of the nation or of the larger cause of world peace. Relying upon

Am J Intl L at 936-37 (cited in note 52) (President "perhaps" might violate international law
pursuant to commander-in-chief power).
54. Lobel, 71 Va L Rev at 1075 (cited in note 52).
55. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997); Alfred Rubin, Ethics and Authority in

International Law (Cambridge 1997); Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International
Law, 33 UCLA L Rev 665 (1986); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw,
41 Vand L Rev 1205 (1988).
56. I have argued elsewhere that the inclusion of treaties in Article VI places duties upon the political
branches to take measures to execute them, but they do not create a constitutional duty for the
courts to execute treaties without implementing legislation. Consider Yoo, 99 Colum L Rev at 1955
(cited in note 47); and Yoo, 99 Colum L Rev at 2218 (cited in note 47).

57. In fact, it was telling that unlike previous conflicts, no prominent international law scholars stepped
forward to criticize President Clintods war in Kosovo as a violation of international law, and hence

a violation of the Constitution, or to file a lawsuit on that basis.
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international law and treaty obligations to block presidential war-making could
undermine the President's control over foreign relations, his commander-in-chief
authority, and even his freedom to participate in the making of new, progressive
international norms. At the level of democratic theory, conceiving of international law
as a restraint on presidential war-making would allow norms of questionable
democratic origin to constrain actions validly taken under the US Constitution by
popularly accountable national representatives. International law might prevent the
United States from using methods that further its security interests, which, as was
made clear in Kosovo, also serve broader international goals of peace and stability.
These difficulties with the argument that international law can constrain US
war-making highlight a sharp contradiction in the internationalist approach to world
affairs, one that afflicts not just legal scholars and lawyers, but the Clinton
administration itself Achieving the progressive goals of international law-ending
human rights violations, restoring stability and peace based on democratic selfdetermination-often requires powerful nations to violate international law norms
about national sovereignty and the use of force. This seems to be not just one of the
lessons of the US victory in the Cold War, but also of our continuing post-Cold War
military interventions. On the one hand, NATO action in Kosovo violated the UN
Charter and, hence, international law. On the other hand, NATO acted to vindicate
international human rights, a cause that has become international legal scholars' bete
noire. In its early interventions, the Clinton administration sought to escape this
paradox by acting through the UN, as he did in Somalia and Haiti. Kosovo, however,
provided little recourse to international law because the UN Security Council failed to
act and it was difficult to claim with a straight face that the use of force was necessary
for our self-defense. If the United States is to play the role of world policeman, it may
increasingly be the case that US efforts to promote world order and stability will come
into conflict with international law norms. These norms, however, might not exist in
any meaningful sense unless international peace is guaranteed first, and that might
only come about through US political and military leadership.
It seems to me that many in the US legal community kept quiet about these
difficulties because they believed the Kosovo conflict served a higher end-that of
promoting a normative vision of international justice in which each individual is
guaranteed a certain minimum of liberty and freedom. If other notions of
international law, such as the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, get
in the way, then so be it. The problems with this sort of reasoning reflect a central
contradiction in international law scholarship today. International legal scholars were
quick to harshly attack wars with objectives they opposed, such as US efforts to
contain the spread of communism in Central America or to restore the balance of
power in the Middle East or to maintain US hegemony in the Caribbean. To
international lawyers, these conflicts reeked too much of Great Power politics and of
an international system rooted in the military, political, and economic power of
nation-states.
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Wars that promote goals long sought by international lawyers, such as the
advancement of universal human rights, do not provoke such criticism. International
legal scholars have failed, however, to apply these principles in a uniform manner.
International lawyers have not demanded intervention in many other situations, most
notably the Russian offensive in Chechnya or the Chinese suppression of domestic
political dissent, not to mention the wholesale violation of human rights by
communist nations before and during the Cold War. This suggests either that
enforcement of human rights depends upon power relationships, or that international
law has yet to fully embrace a norm of humanitarian intervention. Indeed,
international law scholars have shied away from dearly declaring that nations may use
force to stop human rights abuses that wholly occur within other sovereign nations.
Rather than articulate a doctrine that contradicts the basic principles of the UN
Charter and much of Western history since the Peace of Westphalia, international
legal scholars in Kosovo chose the course of silence. If international law is so
contingent on our normative agreement with the results of international politics,
however, it should impose little constraint on US actions to maintain world order.
Basing international law on justice or fairness rather than the UN Charter
system or the practice of states provides no basis for concluding that Western
concepts ofjustice should govern in international law and Russian or Asian or Islamic
understandings should not. Instead, overriding territorial sovereignty and nonintervention principles only opens up international law to multiple, conflicting
interpretation, rooted in fundamental differences in culture and even religion. By
failing to be consistent on Kosovo, international lawyers undermine their own goal,
the rule of law in world affairs. If this is the modern state of international law today, it
certainly ought not constrain the decisions of US leaders in their decision to use force
abroad.
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